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UK	general	election	primers:	Immigration
Polling	data	suggests	that	Brexit	is	viewed	as	the	most	important	issue	for	voters	ahead	of	the	UK’s
general	election	on	12	December.	Immigration,	which	has	previously	been	viewed	as	one	of	the	most
important	issues,	has	experienced	a	relative	decline	in	salience	since	the	last	general	election	in	2017,
but	its	purported	effects	on	the	labour	market	and	the	wider	economy	remain	highly	contested.
Jonathan	Wadsworth	presents	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	current	immigration	picture	in	the	UK	and
the	policy	challenges	the	issue	might	pose	for	the	next	British	government.
Most	people	have	a	sense	that	immigration	has	risen	a	lot	in	the	UK	recently.	And	indeed	it	has.	About	9.5	million
UK	residents	are	immigrants,	some	one	in	seven	(14.3%)	of	people	now	in	the	UK	are	immigrants,	up	from	3.8
million	(7%	of	the	UK	population	in	the	mid	1990s).	This	average	rise	disguises	much	more	varied	changes	over
time	across	and	within	regions,	across	occupations	and	industries.
Economists	have	long	understood	that	these	events	reflect	immigration	decisions	about	where	to	go	and	what	to	do
which	are	influenced	by	assessments	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	a	move	to	another	country.	Individuals	can	decide
to	move	and	indeed	leave	or	migrate	elsewhere	if	economic	and/or	political	conditions	shift	in	favour	of	migration	to
other	countries.	Firms	can	decide	to	utilise	migrant	labour,	train	more,	pay	more,	mechanise	or	move	location
according	to	their	own	assessments	of	the	relative	costs	and	benefits	of	each	option.
Government	policy	and	the	performance	of	the	economy	also	influence	these	costs	and	befits.	The	number	of
immigrants	in	the	UK	is	also	therefore	a	reflection	of	a	series	of	economic	and	political	events	that	have	made	the
UK	relatively	more	or	less	attractive	to	migrants	over	time.	Equally,	the	attractiveness	of	the	UK	to	migrants	from
outside	the	UK	is	influenced	by	relative	economic	circumstances	but	also	by	the	relative	costs	of	entry	embodied	in
the	visa	and	entry	system.
Measure	for	measure
Knowing	the	number	of	immigrants	living	in	the	UK	is	something	of	an	inexact	science.	There	is	no	official	count	of
resident	immigrants,	nor	of	inflows	and	outflows,	despite,	until	recently,	net	inflows	being	a	longstanding
government	target.	Instead,	there	are	different	household	surveys	that	are	used	to	estimate	these	various	stocks
and	flows.	The	Office	for	National	Statistics	(ONS)	has	a	preferred	measure	of	counting	immigration	flows	(the
numbers	arriving	and	the	numbers	leaving),	based	on	analysing	the	International	Passenger	Survey	(IPS).	This
method	has	recently	been	downgraded	to	‘experimental’	status	because	of	concerns	with	coverage	and	weighting.
The	only	official	data	set	that	can	provide	a	regular,	timely	estimate	of	the	total	number	of	immigrants	living	in	the
UK	(not	just	the	yearly	flows	in	and	out)	is	the	Labour	Force	Survey/Annual	Population	Survey	(LFS).	This	is	the
same	survey	that	is	used	to	measure	the	unemployment	rate	in	the	UK.	The	LFS	also	has	detailed	information	on
the	characteristics	of	immigrants	and	those	born	in	the	UK.	So	if	we	want	to	compare,	say,	the	educational
attainment	of	immigrants	and	those	born	in	the	UK,	or	where	immigrants	live,	or	whether	immigrants	are	more	or
less	likely	to	be	unemployed,	or	the	effect	of	immigration	on	the	wages	of	those	born	in	the	UK,	the	LFS	is
practically	the	only	UK	data	set	that	can	be	used	to	investigate	these	and	other	related	issues.
Currently,	the	two	survey	sources	are	sending	conflicting	signals.	The	LFS-based	count	says	that	the	immigrant
population	has	been	static,	and	may	have	even	fallen	a	little	since	2017.	In	contrast,	the	IPS	says	that	net	inflows
(inflows	minus	outflows)	to	the	UK	by	immigrants	have	been	resiliently	positive,	in	the	order	of	250,000	a	year	even
using	the	intermediate	revisions	made	by	the	ONS	to	the	IPS	data.	If	more	immigrants	are	coming	to	the	UK	than
leaving,	immigration	must	be	rising.	The	two	surveys	are	saying	different	things.
Admittedly,	both	data	sources	use	different	definitions	of	immigrants.	The	LFS	defines	immigrants	based	on	country
of	birth	and	usual	residence.	The	IPS	uses	nationality,	as	shown	on	respondents’	passports,	to	define	immigrant
status	with	an	additional	qualification	that	the	survey	respondent	intends	to	stay	for	12	months	or	more.	So	part	of
the	difference	is	likely	to	be	due	to	this.	So	both	may	be	right.	Equally,	both	may	be	wrong	for	different	reasons.	But
the	central	point	is	that	policy	formulation	and	informed	debate	about	immigration	are	currently	compromised	by	the
ambiguity	in	the	data:	the	IPS	says	it’s	going	up,	the	LFS	data	suggests	otherwise	(figures	1	and	2).
Figure	1:	IPS	estimates	of	changes	in	the	immigrant	population	in	the	UK
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	Note:	Compiled	using	data	from	the	International	Passenger	Survey	(IPS).
Figure	2:	LFS	estimates	of	immigration	population	in	the	UK
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Note:	Compiled	using	data	from	Labour	Force	Survey/Annual	Population	Survey	(LFS).
Immigration’s	effects
Immigration	still	seems	to	matter	much	more	politically	than	it	does	economically.	Immigration’s	effects	on	most
areas	of	the	economy	appear	to	be	small.	There	are	neither	large	negative	effects,	nor	large	positive	effects.
It	is	sometimes	suggested	that	immigration	could	compromise	public	services	by	increasing	demand	and
competition	for	publicly	provided	resources.	Unlike	the	UK-born	population,	a	majority	of	immigrants	are	in
employment	and	so	are	over-represented	among	the	total	number	in	work.	Immigrants	are,	however,	a	little	over-
represented	in	the	unemployed	and	economically	inactive	populations,	but	under-represented	among	children	and
pensionable	age	populations	–	because	they	tend	to	arrive	as	adults	and	not	all	migrants	stay	in	the	UK	until	a
pensionable	age	(or	the	current	cohort	of	migrants	have	not	been	in	the	UK	long	enough	to	reach	a	pensionable
age).
Immigrants	are	younger	and	therefore	more	likely	to	be	healthier.	They	are	also	more	highly	qualified	on	average
than	the	UK	population,	and	more	likely	to	be	in	(higher	paid)	work	than	the	average	UK-born	individual.	Together
all	this	underlies	the	reason	why	several	studies,	summarised	by	the	Migration	Advisory	Committee	find	that
immigrants	are	net	fiscal	contributors,	paying	more	in	taxes	than	they	receive	in	benefits	and,	as	such,	are	less
likely	to	put	pressure	on	public	services	like	the	NHS	or	schools.
Immigration	policy	options
The	policy	options	offered	by	the	different	political	parties	in	this	election	vary	from	retaining	the	existing	system	to	a
points-based	system	that	shows	no	favour	for	EU	migrants	over	non-EU	migrants.
Immigration	to	the	UK	contains	three	distinct	groups:	workers	and	their	families;	students;	and	refugees.	All	three
groups	are	covered	by	different	rules	and	visa	schemes.	Future	policy	has	to	balance	the	costs	and	benefits	of
changing	the	rules	for	each	area.	A	new	government	has	to	decide	essentially	who	gets	in,	for	how	long	and	at
what	cost	among	the	many	disparate	groups	of	potential	immigrants.	This	is	not	an	easy	task.	The	immediate
consequences	of	Brexit,	if	it	happens,	may	be	very	different	from	what	governments	may	want	from	a	long-term
immigration	strategy.	Policy	may	have	to	be	designed	flexibly	to	address	the	resulting	short-term	versus	long-term
issues.
With	regard	to	the	labour	market,	firms	with	labour	shortages	can	train	more,	automate	more,	change	work
practices	(such	as	pay	or	working	conditions)	or	move	instead	of	using	labour	from	abroad.	Indeed,	it	may	well	be
that	the	change	in	direction	of	EU	immigration	flows	following	Brexit	has	already	forced	some	adjustment	by	firms,
so	the	immediate	migration	response	of	increased	outflows	and	a	fall	in	inflows	after	the	vote	has	forced	firms	to
address	the	new	reality	without	there	being	any	change	in	policy.	If	not,	sector-specific	and	time-limited	or	seasonal
migration	schemes	(from	the	EU	or	elsewhere)	could	allow	workers	into	the	less	skilled	sectors	until	businesses	had
adapted	to	the	new	policy	environment.	The	downside	of	such	a	policy	is	that	sectors	may	postpone	any	changes	to
their	business	model.
Any	quotas	or	work	visas	for	EU	nationals	after	Brexit	are	also	likely	to	favour	graduate	sector	jobs.	This	is	partly
because	the	existing	immigration	policy	for	non-EU	citizens	is	almost	exclusively	restricted	to	graduate-level	jobs
and	partly	because	the	net	fiscal	contribution	from	graduates	is	likely	to	be	higher	than	from	non-graduate	jobs.
Whether	there	are	more	shortages	in	this	area	or	in	the	vocational	sector	due	to	the	UK’s	relatively	poor	training
record	is	open	to	discussion.	It	may	be	that	a	revised	shortage	list	could	be	broadened,	again,	to	include	the	type	of
shortage	vocational	jobs	that	were	originally	on	the	list.
Immigration	could	also	be	targeted	at	individuals	rather	than	jobs,	effectively	reverting	to	a	points-based	system,	a
form	of	which	was	in	place	in	the	UK	in	the	late	2000s	but	subsequently	dropped	by	the	coalition	government	of
2010-2015.	Coming	up	with	a	coherent	points	system	is	not	an	easy	thing	to	do,	(the	MAC	are	currently	tasked	with
looking	in	to	it).	Targeting	individual	graduates	may	not	help	graduate	sectors	if	the	graduates	migrate	to	less	skilled
occupations.
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Occupation-based	entry	shortage	schemes	rather	than	individual	points-based	entry	have	the	advantage	that
labour	market	signals	can	better	determine	which	sectors	are	in	shortage.	Letting	firms	and	workers	interact	within
informed	general	government	imposed	guidelines	(such	as	restricting	entry	to	graduate	or	higher	paying	jobs)	is
probably	a	better	way	to	get	good	job	matches.	Restricting	by	occupation	rather	than	people	will	probably	reduce
migration	flows	more,	since	the	set	of	eligible	occupations	is	easier	to	restrict	than	a	set	of	eligible	individuals.
Limiting	immigration	to	those	with	job	offers	in	certain	occupations	does	not,	however,	automatically	restrict
migration	to	these	sectors.	Students	can	work	in	the	UK	before	and	after	graduation.	Non-EEA	family	migrants	can
work	in	any	sector	in	the	UK.	Firms	can	bring	in	employees	from	international	subsidiaries	in	occupations	not	on	a
shortage	list	(inter-company	transfers).	Workers	can	leave	jobs	for	other	sectors.
There	are	also	issues	of	regional	or,	more	likely,	country-specific	immigration	schemes	to	consider.	Scotland	has
some	additional	leeway	over	its	work	route	since	it	has	its	own	shortage	occupation	list.	Country/regional-based
schemes	are	easier	to	operate	with	temporary	visas.	With	permanent	residence,	individuals	can	move	away	from
the	area	that	sought	to	attract	migrants,	which	can	then	negate	the	effect	of	the	policy	to	attract	migrants.	But
temporary	visas	bring	other	problems.	If	individuals	are	tied	to	a	particular	employer,	this	gives	the	employer	more
power	over	a	worker	than	if	the	worker	were	free	to	choose	where	to	work.	Temporary	visas	increase	the	likelihood
that	some	individuals	may	overstay	the	length	of	their	visa.
The	Immigration	Skills	Charge	on	any	firm	hiring	labour	from	outside	the	EU	has	been	in	place	since	2017.	It	is	too
early	to	tell	whether	this	has	deterred	some	firms	from	hiring,	but	knowledge	of	this	policy	and	its	effects	would	be
welcome	in	helping	decide	whether	and	how	to	extend	to	hiring	workers	from	the	EU.
Conclusions
The	options	for	future	immigration	policy	are	many	and	varied	and	there	are	no	easy	answers	as	to	what	to	do	or
what	to	prioritise.	Whichever	party	is	in	power	after	the	election	may	well	have	an	immigration	policy	that	,	like	so
many	policies	in	the	UK,	evolves	and	reacts	to	events	and	the	unforeseen	consequences	of	previous	actions.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	first	appeared	on	our	sister	site,	LSE	Brexit.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of
EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	The	report	on	which	this	blog	is
based	is	available	here:	CEP	Election	Analysis:	Immigration.
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